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The new member states and the Common agricultural 
policy: Expectations, preparation and results
Miklós Somai
Introduction
The year 2014 offers good opportunity to look back on the history of the first waves of Eastern enlargement. 
Thus, it is fully packed with expert meetings and conferences aimed at taking stock of the experiences of first 7-
year (in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) or 10-year (for the others) membership within the European Union 
(EU). The introduction of the common agricultural policy (CAP) and the gradual application of its main support 
schemes for farmers are emerging as key issues of interest at the above-mentioned events.
Apart from giving a short explanation about the exceptional character of the Eastern enlargement, the purpose of 
this study is to highlight some lessons learned from agricultural accession, by displaying how production and 
trade evolved in EU’s new member states (EU10).53
Before 1993, it was appropriate to apply a transition period to the acceding countries while duties, quotas and 
other barriers to trade between the old and the new members had been dismantled parallel to the process of 
extending the CAP and its subsidies to the new entrants. However, since 1993, with the launch of the European 
single market, border controls between member states were eliminated. Hence, it was natural that the EFTA 
enlargement (Austria, Finland and Sweden) in 1995 was already carried out under a “Big Bang” scenario; as of 
the first day of their membership, the three new EU countries became fully integrated into the single market. Their 
products of both industrial and agricultural origin gained free access to the old member states’ markets and vice 
versa, while their farmers obtained all CAP subsidies available in the same way as did their counterparts in the 
Based on data of development dynamics – and with some 
focus on Hungary – I will attempt to present differences in development paths and consider some reasons lying 
behind such differences. In addition, I will devote particular attention to the opportunities and challenges the new 
multiannual financial framework (MFF 2014-2020) may bring to EU-10 farmers through the reformed CAP.
Exceptional enlargement – starting conditions
For some of its important features, the EU 2004 enlargement maybe regarded as exceptional. First, never before 
so many countries could join the EU at the same time; second, never before democratizing states had been kept 
waiting for so long to enter the integration; third – and focusing on the practical implementation of the CAP 
instruments in the new member states – never before had there been so much deviation from EU’s own rules. If 
one puts together these three features of the 2004 enlargement, it is clear that never before had newcomers been 
treated on such an unequal footing to those already inside.
53 EU10 covers the three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the two countries of the Balkans (Romania and Bulgaria), the 
Visegrád countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) and Slovenia. As a methodological remark, it should be noted that 
due to lack of sufficient comparable data for EU10 countries, I sorted the new member states based on some other criteria, too. 
Accordingly, countries of the 2004 enlargement are named NMS or NMS (2004). NMS without Malta, Cyprus are named EU8, and EU8 
without Hungary are named EU7. The old member states are called EU15. Finally, the label V4 (or Visegrád countries) covers Poland, 
Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.
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old member states. From a point of view of effective competition policy, it was completely natural and necessary 
that after the mutual and immediate market opening, the agricultural producers of the new members got into a 
regulatory and subsidisation environment identical to that faced by their homologues in the old member states.
Having all the above in mind, it was very disappointing watching from Eastern Europe the debate on the 
agricultural aspects of the 2004 enlargement carried out during the 1990s and early 2000s. In these preparatory 
negotiations, experts called upon by the Commission had for long years been arguing about whether it would be 
wise, beneficial or necessary to extend CAP direct payments, i.e. the main part of the farm subsidies, to the new 
entrants. They did so as if such double standards between farmers of old and new member states were not 
prohibited by EU competition law to persist. Unfortunately, during the long negotiation period before accession, 
the theory according to which cheap, abundant and underutilised agricultural labour and land in EU10 would 
represent comparative advantages for their farmers became widely accepted in the old member states (EU15).54
This approach, however, badly underestimated the capital intensity per worker of the principal technical functions 
of modern agricultural production.55
54 See the papers of Buckwell, Josling, Mahé, Tangermann and Tarditi referred to in Somai (2002).
55 Pouliquen (2001) p.15
According to the then widespread professional perception, candidates from 
Central and Eastern Europe were less in need of price and income (i.e. CAP first pillar) support – as they 
produced ‘cheaply enough’ – than that of structural aid, to be financed from the second (i.e. rural development) 
pillar of the CAP.
By December 2002, when enlargement negotiations were reaching their final stage, the East European 
negotiating politico-economic elite had already got accustomed to their Western colleagues’ increasingly 
entrenched position described above. Finally, they came to the conclusion that in order to realize accession within 
a reasonable timeframe, they would have to accept a scenario of full membership only at the end of a long 
transition period. The result is well known: the transition period for agricultural accession was set at ten years, 
only at the end of which (i.e. in 2013) gradually introduced direct payments reached the normal EU level. In 
addition, production levels used to determine per hectare direct payments in NMS, unlike in EU15 (i.e. ensuing 
from normative EU laws), were not set out based on the late 1980s, but on a period much closer to the 
enlargement. For countries (e.g. Hungary) where the negative effects of the systemic transition had been felt 
longer than elsewhere (e.g. Poland) and agricultural production remained under the pre-transition level, or at best 
fluctuated heavily, this arrangement limited the subsidies available under the CAP regime even further. Overall, 
Brussels was more inclined to circumvent their own established rules and regulations of both agricultural and 
competition policies than to treat the new Central and Eastern members as equal partners by ensuring them full 
rights under the acquis communautaire.
Ultimately, this unprecedented discrimination of the new entrants – exposing their farmers to uneven competition 
stemming from a combination of compulsory immediate full opening of their markets and a temporarily unequal 
support system – became a precedent for subsequent enlargements of the EU towards Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007, and Croatia in 2013.
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Main trends
Despite the significant increase in agricultural output, the accession to the EU itself could not reverse the long-
term trend of decreasing primary sector (agriculture, forestry and fishing) in the economies of the NMS. It was 
clearly so because from the accession until 2008, growth in the other two main (i.e. secondary and tertiary) 
sectors of the economy happened to be even faster. From 2011 onwards, however, as a delayed reaction to 
global financial and economic crisis, which caused deeper recession in manufacturing and services than in
primary sectors, the above-mentioned trend seems to be broken – at least the available data provide such a 
picture. Between 2011 and 2013, the share of primary sector in total gross value added (GVA) of the NMS 
stabilized at around 3.5 per cent, a level somewhat higher than that reached in the years of 2009 and 2010, and 
close to what it was in 2006/2007.56
We can observe a similar phenomenon in employment as well, with the difference that the declining trend of the 
primary sector in NMS has only flattened since the outbreak of the crisis – at around 9 percent of the total 
employment, so circa three times the level in the EU15
It should be noted that there was a similar break in the EU15, although, at a 
much lower level than in the NMS; the primary sector share stayed at around 1.5 of total GVA.
57. Of course, this does not mean that there would not 
have been any halt or reversal of the trend in the cases of some individual member states. For example, between 
2009 and 2011, the share of agriculture in total employment rose from 4.2 to 4.7 per cent in Estonia and from 6.9 
to 7.3 per cent in Hungary. This role of the agriculture, however, which consists of absorbing temporarily a part of 
the redundant workforce released by the other sectors in times of crisis, is evident in some old member states 
too, especially those in trouble. Between 2009 and 2012, the above share rose from 4.5 to 5.7 per cent in Ireland 
and from 11.6 to 12.9 per cent in Greece.58
If there is anything like a trend in post-accession development of NMS agriculture, it is the concentration of 
production in ever fewer hands, i.e. the considerable decrease in the number and a parallel increase in the size of 
farms. However, as the follow-up of these developments is closely dependent on agricultural surveys and 
censuses undertaken only every five to ten years, data are available only until 2010. Based on this data, land 
concentration in the EU10 accelerated between 2005 and 2010. But, as the same thing took place in the EU15, 
the difference in economic size of average farms between the old and the new member states measured in 
standard output (SO) – a currently used indicator to determine the scale of production – still increased in absolute 
terms and remained approximately of the same magnitude in relative terms (see Table 1). Aggregates, however, 
hide huge differences between countries: average holdings in Slovakia and the Czech Republic are much bigger 
than in EU15, and Estonian farms are already comparable in size to those in Ireland or Italy; holdings of the other 
new members are far smaller, especially in Romania. In relative terms, first compared to themselves, in six 
countries out of the EU10, the economic size of average farms increased at a very high speed (the SO growing 
by between 1.6 and 3.7 times); among the laggards there were Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and Lithuania. Now, 
compared to the EU15, almost the same findings could be established, with one more remark: a lot depended on 
the starting point. Bulgaria, for example, who made a big step towards a more concentrated farm structure, could 
not reduce its handicap vis-à-vis the EU15 considerably. Hungary advanced very slowly, much more slowly than 
most of the EU7 on average or its Visegrád partners, countries most suitable for comparison.59
56 The estimated share for Bulgaria and Romania is a bit higher, around 5-6% of their GVA. (Source: Eurostat)
57 European Commission (2014) p. 2 – Bulgaria
58 European Commission (web)
59 It is to be added that behind the data showing huge concentration in some of the NMS from 2005 to 2010, there is a sharp reduction in 
the number of farms, which in turn is at least partly due to methodological changes in the Farm Structure Survey. (Source: European 
Commission 2014, p. 3)
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Table 1: Dynamics of standard outputs in agriculture of the new member states and their relative 
size compared to those of the EU15’s
2005 2010 2005 2010
Change in the handicap vis-
à-vis EU15 (2005-2010)
euro/holding percent
EU15 42 158 50 075 100.0 100.0
CzechRepublic 88 711 170 603 210.4 340.7 -118.0
Estonia 17 431 30 554 41.3 61.0 -33.5
Latvia 4 565 9 356 10.8 18.7 -8.8
Lithuania 6 131 7 645 14.5 15.3 -0.9
Poland 6 523 12 669 15.5 25.3 -11.6
Slovenia 10 809 12 264 25.6 24.5 1.5
Slovakia 19 910 72 977 47.2 145.7 -186.7
NMS (2004) 7 976 13 637 18.9 27.2 -10.3
EU7 8 012 14 770 19.0 29.5 -13.0
Hungary 7 431 9 814 17.6 19.6 -2.4
EU8 7 909 13 692 18.8 27.3 -10.6
Romania 2 552 2 798 6.1 5.6 0.5
Bulgaria 4 459 7 099 10.6 14.2 -4.0
EU10 5 054 7 125 12.0 14.2 -2.6
Source: Eurostat
Production
When it comes to measuring the EU10 performance in agricultural production, there are two methods; it is 
possible to adopt an “in-kind” or a value approach. As for the first option – because taking into account the 
differences stemming from cultural, climatic and other factors – would require far too much time and space, this 
study will mainly use the second one. Out of the indices of production, temporal changes of two of them 
(agricultural output and gross value added) are shown in Table 2 and 3.
In preparing the tables, the period of 2002-2013 was divided into four sections of equal length, and then the 
second, third and fourth three-year sub-periods were compared with the first one, that of 2002-2004. The latter 
can be seen as representing the last couple of years when the EU accession (and CAP subsidies) could not have 
a significant impact yet. Considering the weather exposure of the agriculture and trying to avoid distortions arising 
from comparing single years with each other, the use of 3-year averages seemed to be a reasonable solution.60
60 Data for Romania and Bulgaria – and thus also for EU10 – are for reference purposes only, as their accession came 3 years later (in 
2007). Naturally, one could compare the first six years (i.e. the first and the second three-year cycles) of their membership with that of the 
other countries entering the EU in 2004. This would show that their production grew slower than that of the Baltics and Poland, but faster 
than that of the rest of the NMS, and that their performance in crop production was much better than in animal husbandry. However, such 
comparison would not be adequate, as agricultural production – in contrast to the industrial production – is highly dependent on external 
factors, like weather. Thus, differences in speed of development stem not only from differences in performances but also from differences 
in weather conditions of the subsequent years.
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Table 2: Changes in agricultural output and GVA based on 3-year averages (2002-2004 = 100%)
Output Gross value added
2005-07/
2002-04
2008-10/
2002-04
2011-13/
2002-04
2011-13
average 
2005-07/
2002-04
2008-10/
2002-04
2011-13/
2002-04
2011-13
average
percent m. euro percent m. euro
EU15 115.2 127.0 147.6 4 866 104.7 95.4 134.7 1 377
CzechRepublic 134.2 141.1 191.7 863 138.7 115.3 178.7 326
Estonia 143.7 154.2 196.0 848 128.8 102.4 112.3 193
Latvia 140.2 163.8 225.6 2 852 147.8 152.2 247.4 1 075
Lithuania 130.5 150.1 175.1 22 970 139.9 149.4 181.3 9 036
Poland 104.2 107.1 113.6 1 185 99.8 87.6 91.0 418
Slovenia 106.1 118.1 134.4 2 313 98.6 86.1 109.0 547
Slovakia 98.3 103.3 115.8 337 213 89.6 85.1 92.8 133 664
NMS (2004) 120.2 134.1 157.5 44 348 123.5 124.3 156.5 16 103
EU7 115.7 137.6 163.9 35 895 130.4 132.9 167.2 12 972
Hungary 103.2 108.6 125.5 7 632 105.4 100.2 129.6 2 735
EU8 120.8 135.0 158.8 43 527 125.1 125.9 159.2 15 707
Romania 120.3 138.0 146.6 16 873 107.8 118.3 122.6 7 376
Bulgaria 97.7 116.9 122.4 4 233 89.9 96.0 100.1 1 578
EU10 118.8 134.3 152.6 64 634 115.9 120.6 141.3 24 661
Note: Output of the agricultural industry is made up of the sum of the output of agricultural products, agricultural services and of the 
goods and services produced in inseparable non-agricultural secondary activities. Gross value added corresponds to the value of 
output less the value of intermediate consumption. The basic price is defined as the price received by the producer, after deduction of 
all taxes on products but including all subsidies on products.
Source: Eurostat
As for Table 2, let me make some general remarks – true for most of the examined period – regarding both of the 
indices (output and GVA). First, the EU10 as a group, and each of its constituent countries grew faster than the 
average of the EU15. The best performance was recorded by Poland and the Baltic states (except for Latvia for 
the GVA). They were followed by a sort of middle of the rank, with the only “rule” being that Romania and the 
Czech Republic appeared mainly in the upper section, while Slovakia and Bulgaria in the lower one. Hungary’s 
performance has been mixed: by its output in general and its performance during the first six years in particular, it 
clearly ranked among the worst performing countries; but, by its GVA, especially for the last three-year sub-
period, it managed to climb the ladder higher up.
Of course, at least part of the above phenomena may be explained by some quite banal reasons. For example, 
the less developed a country is, the faster it can grow and vice versa. Indeed, measured in GDP per capita in 
PPS, the Baltics (but also Poland) started their development within the EU from a very low level (from between 
44-55% of the EU28 average), at least from a much lower level than e.g. Slovenia (84%), the Czech Republic 
(77%) or Hungary (63%) did.61
61 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114
Also, their agricultural sector especially that of the Baltics, provided very low yields 
before accession. So, the least one can say is that they had room for improvement. At the other end of the 
ranking, one can find the small but very developed Slovenia, the only one in the EU10 whose agricultural 
performance in the last nine years was even worse than that of the EU15 on average. As a matter of fact, its 
agriculture, at the moment of EU accession, was undoubtedly at the highest level among candidate countries. 
The amount of its per hectare direct payments, a mirror of historical production patterns, is not only above both 
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new and old member states’ average, but also above that of France and Germany.62 Also Slovenia is the only 
one to have adopted the SPS (or Single Payment Scheme) regime in 2007 – a compulsory system for distributing 
direct payments in EU15 introduced with CAP reform 2003. So, regarding this element of the CAP, it is Slovene 
farmers – alone in EU10 – who since 2007 have been getting access to direct payments on entirely equal footing 
with their colleagues from EU15.63
Table 3: Changes in crop and animal output based on 3-year averages (2002-2004 = 100%)
Crop output Animal output
2005-07/
2002-04
2008-10/
2002-04
2011-13/
2002-04
2011-13
average
2005-07/
2002-04
2008-10/
2002-04
2011-13/
2002-04
2011-13
average
percent m. euro percent m. euro
CzechRepublic 116.1 133.6 171.8 2 868 111.0 116.8 117.1 1 779
Estonia 145.8 145.8 219.4 377 125.6 135.5 172.3 400
Latvia 151.3 173.3 231.8 451 137.2 148.4 177.2 317
Lithuania 133.2 166.6 255.1 1 687 140.5 142.1 168.1 946
Poland 130.4 154.7 181.8 11 821 132.9 148.1 172.5 10 512
Slovenia 107.1 113.0 122.4 627 100.9 100.5 104.5 537
Slovakia 111.3 126.0 159.4 1 192 102.7 112.0 112.9 893
EU15 95.3 100.1 109.6 169 558 100.4 104.4 120.7 141 119
NMS (2004) 122.7 140.9 171.6 23 927 118.6 128.5 145.2 17 486
EU7 126.4 148.2 181.9 19 024 125.8 137.3 155.5 15 384
Hungary 112.1 120.5 143.6 4 502 92.5 95.8 108.0 2 584
EU8 123.1 141.8 173.0 23 526 119.3 129.2 146.3 17 969
Romania 114.2 141.1 154.7 11 392 111.9 106.1 105.2 4 006
Bulgaria 97.9 131.6 149.3 2 518 105.8 109.9 107.0 1 175
EU10 118.3 140.8 165.3 37 437 116.8 122.9 134.7 23 150
Source: Eurostat
From Table 3, where data for agricultural output are split into two parts distinguishing between crop and animal 
husbandry, one can reach similar conclusions to those drawn from Table 2. Here too, the best performers are 
Poland and the Baltics, but their advantage over the others is much less pronounced in crop than in animal 
products. Another similarity with Table 2 is that EU15’s development is slower than that of the new members on 
average, no matter what their composition is (i.e. NMS, EU7, EU8, EU10 or else). Finally, Hungary is again 
among the worst performers: even in its best period (i.e. the years of 2011-2013), the pace of its development is 
half of the EU7’s for the crop and only one-seventh of it for the animal output. Nevertheless, there is an important 
trend which can be discerned from the data of Table 3: although the speed of development is relatively slower in 
the EU15, this latter is the only group of countries where the growth of animal output exceeds that of crop output. 
In other words, while in each new member state the proportion of crop and animal husbandry has gradually been 
shifting towards the former, in the old member states exactly the opposite has been taking place (see Figure 1). 
Among the EU10 countries only Poland was able to keep the importance of the animal sector at its pre-accession 
level (a loss of 1.3 percentage point only). As for the other new members, Slovenia has performed relatively well 
62 See Council of the European Union (2011) and Figure 1 at the final chapter
63 6HH3RWRþQLN– Lombardero (2004) p. 379
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(-3.9 pp) and in Estonia, in spite of a quite significant decline in share (-6.0 pp), animal husbandry remained more 
important than crop production. In the rest of the EU10, the animal sector lost between 6.6 and 10.1 percentage 
points.
Figure 1: Changes in proportion of animal output, 3-year averages 
agricultural output = 100%
 
Source: Eurostat
As for the relative importance of the speed of development, it is to be clearly understood that although the EU10 
crop production has developed seven times faster than that of the EU15, in reality, there was no difference in the 
amount of increase (approx. EUR 15 billion from 2002/04 to 2011/13). As for the animal output, the ratio of the 
speed of development was less significant (only 1:1.7 in favour of EU10), but in value the EU15 progressed by 
EUR 24 billion against a mere 6 billion achieved by the EU10. It is to be noted that this progression of EUR 24 
billion was higher than the average annual animal output in the EU10 at the end of the period (i.e. in 2011/13). 
Table 3 and Figure 1 already foreshadow the events that took place in intra-EU trade for the last one and a half 
decade, enabling the old member states to take full advantage of the opportunities brought about by the Eastern 
enlargements to find new markets for their highly competitive animal sector.
Trade developments
Statistical data on international trade are be treated and interpreted very cautiously; this is the main conclusion 
drawn after thoroughly examining several trade reports and statistical data sets on agrifood trade within and 
outside the European Union. Frequent changes in methodology and consecutive data refreshments can cause 
comprehensive reviews to become obsolete within a very short lapse of time. Not to mention that the hidden 
economy, which in the EU10 is likely to have larger dimensions than in the EU15, may cause severe bias in trade 
statistics and evaluations. Bearing all the above in mind, the best solution seems to be to focus on those key 
phenomena and trends that are supported by most of the sources.64
64 See e.g. Carraresi – Banterle (2013) or Csáki – Jámbor (2013)
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2002-04 2005-07 2008-10 2011-13
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Slovenia
Slovakia
EU15
Hungary
Romania
Bulgaria
Miklós Somai: The new member states and the common agricultural policy: Expectations, preparation...
68 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries
Figure 2: Balance of extra EU27 trade of food, drinks and tobacco
million euro
 
Source: Eurostat
In the assessment of the European Commission released in April 2014 evaluating the first 10 years of the 2004 
enlargement, there are a number of findings on the trade aspects of NMS’ agricultural accession65 that could also 
have been reported almost unchanged on those of the EU10s’. One of such findings is associated with the 
increased demand for NMS products, stemming from the free access of these countries to the Single Market and 
driving the growth in competitiveness with economies of scale, which made their exports outside the EU more 
competitive. The report also states that agricultural exports to third countries have grown even faster than to the 
EU15. As a matter of fact, the extra EU exports of EU10 are on a constant uptrend for the last 10 or even 14 
years for some countries like Poland or Hungary (See Figure 2).66
65 European Commission (2014) p. 9
66 As liberalization of agrifood trade between the EU and the candidate countries significantly accelerated in the years preceding their 
accession, it seemed a reasonable choice to collect and analyse statistics from as far back as the late 1990s.
Except for Slovenia, all the other EU10 have 
achieved a positive balance in agrifood trade with extra-EU countries and the slope of the upward trends became 
even steeper from the outbreak of the global crisis. So, apparently, these countries have managed to increase 
their competitiveness outside the EU, due most probably to both rising access to CAP subsidies and their 
utilisation (like e.g. investing into farm modernisation). However, it appears that even increasing CAP support 
cannot help all EU10 farmers to overcome the competitive disadvantage they have to operate at, vis-à-vis their 
EU15 counterparts. Their handicap results from the accumulation and capitalisation in buildings, machinery, 
equipment and livestock of those subsidies the West European farmers benefited from for long decades and 
continue to benefit from. At least this is the conclusion one can draw looking at intra EU27 trade developments 
(see Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Balance of intra EU27 trade of food, drinks and tobacco 
million euro
Source: Eurostat
The only country that could undoubtedly make full use of its EU accession and ensure an almost continuous 
improvement of its intra EU trade balance was Poland. All the other EU10 countries, with the exception of 
Lithuania until 2006, have seen their balances, at least temporarily, deteriorating through the process of mutual 
liberalisation of agrifood trade with the group of EU15. Most of them – i.e. the three Baltics, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania – ended up with much bigger deficit than initially. Bulgaria returned to the same 
near equilibrium position of its trade balance it had before having entered the EU, while Hungary managed to 
overcome the initial difficulties and became the second best performer behind Poland. Finally, one more 
observation in connection to Figure 3: two countries with excellent natural endowments for agriculture, namely 
Romania and Hungary, had experienced important deterioration in their respective intra EU trade balance during 
the first years after accession. This similarity may clearly indicate errors committed during their preparation for 
membership.67
Source: Eurostat
Figure 4: Balance of intra and extra EU trade of food, drinks and tobacco 
million euro
67 Other scholars reached a similar conclusion, too. In a study, they go so far as to claiming that in some of the new member states (like in 
Romania and Hungary) “the majority of farmers were not prepared for the accession”. (See Csáki and Jámbor 2013, p. 47) 
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When it comes to adding up the results of extra and intra EU27 agrifood trade (see Figure 4), one cannot but 
refer to another finding of the aforementioned assessment of the Commission, whereby fast rising exports (i.e. 
exports rising faster than imports) transformed the NMS from a net importer to a net exporter.68 Of course, this 
statement is true for NMS as a group only, because there are many differences within the group. The EU10 as a 
group could report positive trade balance only in the last few years. Data for the period from 1999 to 2009 reflect 
a rather uneven development, when the EU10 cumulative deficit fluctuated between EUR 509 and 1,644 million. 
Since 2009/2010, however, due mainly to a skyrocketing improvement in the performance of the three main 
producer countries (i.e. that of Poland, Romania and Hungary), the EU10 agrifood trade deficit has turned into a 
growing surplus.
Taking the new member states individually, one can find out that only four of the EU10 countries (namely Poland, 
Hungary, Lithuania and Bulgaria) kept scoring mostly positive balance during the examined years. They were 
joined by Latvia at the very end of the period. As for the remaining five countries, none of them could report a 
trade surplus since 1999. Three of them saw their performance worsening, their deficit doubling (for the Czech 
Republic) or even tripling (for Slovakia and Slovenia) between 1999 and 2013. The deficit of Estonia was 
stagnating for the whole period, while that of Romania, after having taken an immense roundabout way towards 
the low negative range, returned to more or less the same level it had started from (see Figure 4).
If one returns now to the EU10 as a group and takes a closer look at its exports and imports growth rates, one 
finds the following. Exports really did grow faster than imports, taking either the period between 1999 and 2013 or 
that from 2004 to 2013. Also did the growth rate of both exports and imports exceed those of the old member 
states. However, despite the much faster increase of exports of EU10 than of EU15, as the initial positions were 
extremely different, the extra exports of the EU15 represent several times that of the EU10 (see Table 4). The 
same logic holds true for the difference between exports and imports growth.
Table 4: Changes in absolute and relative terms in trade of food, drinks and tobacco
Export (Bn. euro) 2013/1999 2013/2004
Extra export minus extra 
import (Bn. euro)
1999 2004 2013 1999=100 Bn. euro 2004=100 Bn. euro 2013/1999 2013/2004
EU10 7.04 13.07 49.12 6.97 42.08 3.76 36.05 8.74 8.65
EU15 171.24 211.33 349.90 2.04 178.66 1.66 138.57 15.20 16.41
Import (Bn. euro) 2013/1999 2013/2004
Growth diff. in pp. btw.
export + import
1999 2004 2013 1999=100 Bn. euro 2004=100 Bn. euro 2013/1999 2013/2004
EU10 8.23 14.16 41.56 5.05 33.34 2.93 27.40 192.00 82.30
EU15 175.66 216.96 339.12 1.93 163.46 1.56 122.16 11.30 9.30
Source: Eurostat
Of course, taken individually, the member states show huge differences regarding the speed of growth of their 
agrifood exports and imports. The fastest increase in exports was achieved by the two less developed Baltic 
States (i.e. Latvia and Lithuania) and Romania, while in imports the afore-mentioned two Baltic States were 
‘accompanied’ by Bulgaria. Among the countries showing the slowest progress one can find Hungary (with the 
68 European Commission (2014) p. 9
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worst performance in three out of the possible four cases), the Czech Republic, Estonia and, for the period of 
1999-2013, Slovenia (see Table 5). Naturally, one has to take into account that the value of agrifood trade of
these countries was still rather insignificant compared with that of the EU15’s, both in 1999 and 2004. In current 
prices, EU15 agrifood exports were 24 and 16 times, their imports 21 and 15 times larger than the EU10’s, in 
1999 and 2004 respectively.
Table 5: Speed of growth in trade of food, drinks & tobacco*
2013/1999
Exports or Imports of year 2013 compared to Exports or Imports of year 1999
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10
Exports 6.20 5.70 7.04 21.86 15.11 3.55 8.16 14.11 4.47 7.40 6.97
Imports 7.82 4.34 4.33 6.41 7.82 4.90 4.56 6.24 3.88 5.31 5.05
2013/2004
Exports or Imports of year 2013 compared to Exports or Imports of year 2004
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10
Exports 4.17 2.96 3.40 7.50 5.33 2.48 3.74 9.69 3.80 3.50 3.76
Imports 3.84 2.39 2.51 3.45 4.54 2.16 3.29 2.77 2.70 3.06 2.93
*The times the trade was increased; fastest growing countries in green, laggards in red
Source: Eurostat
Measured in per capita terms, the value of exports of the EU10 was a mere one-seventh and one-fourth, that of 
the imports one-sixth and one-fourth of that of the EU15, for the above mentioned two years.69 But, averages 
mask huge differences. In 1999, per capita values of exports ranged between EUR 13 (for Romania) and EUR 
186 (for Hungary); that of imports between EUR 31 (for (Romania) and EUR 286 (for Slovenia). The average 
values of the EU15: EUR 455 and EUR 467 respectively. In fact, there was enough room for trade to develop 
substantially. Therefore, when contemplating Table 6 which compares exports and imports growth rates to each 
other, such indices above 2 or even 3 (in case of Latvia and Romania) need to be properly evaluated, bearing in 
mind what level these countries’ indices started from.
Table 6: Speed of growth in trade of food, drinks and tobacco*
Exports of year 2013/exports of year 1999 or 2004/ Imports of  year 2013/imports of year 1999 or 2004
BG CZ EE LV LT HU PL RO SI SK EU10
2013/1999 0.79 1.31 1.63 3.41 1.93 0.72 1.79 2.26 1.15 1.39 1.38
2013/2004 1.09 1.24 1.37 2.17 1.17 1.15 1.14 3.49 1.40 1.14 1.28
Exports of year 2013/exports of year 1999 or 2004/ Imports of  year 2013/imports of year 1999 or 2004
BE DK DE IE ES FR IT NL AT UK EU15
2013/1999 1.02 0.80 1.45 0.70 1.24 0.90 1.23 0.95 1.20 0.84 1.06
2013/2004 0.99 0.87 1.19 0.80 1.28 0.97 1.21 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.06
*The times exports increased faster than imports; exports grew faster than imports if the index > 1
Source: Eurostat
69 These values reached 56% for exports and 49% for imports by 2013. (Source: Eurostat)
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One more aspect of EU10 agrifood trade developments is worth mentioning if one wants to have a clear picture 
about where these countries started from and where they arrived to. By considering the 27 EU member states 
and arranging them in descending order by value of exports and imports, the following picture emerges. As for 
the exports, in 1999, only a few of the EU10 could rank higher than any of the EU15 countries; most of them 
ranked at the bottom of the list, doing only better than Cyprus and Malta. By 2013, at first sight significant shifts 
occurred, as several EU10 countries moved 4-5 or even 7 places upwards on the list. This was the case of 
Romania, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. The others remained at the same place or moved at most 2 places up or 
down. But, if one takes a closer look, it becomes clear that countries of the EU10 mostly outpaced each other. 
True, most of them did already better than Luxemburg or Finland, and some of them did better than Greece or 
Portugal. But, regarding the places they occupied in the rankings in 1999 and 2013, it turns out that, if we 
eliminate Poland, the other 9 countries of the EU10 ranked from 14th to 26th places in 1999 and from 13th to 24th in 
2013. Something similar happened in the case of imports, but with somewhat smaller upwards moves and nine of 
the EU10 ranking from 16th to 26th places in 1999 moved to 14th to 25th in 2013. Poland was the only one who 
really made a qualitative change and left behind the other EU10 countries; ranking 8th place for both exports and 
imports, it outpaced such major agrifood traders as Denmark, Ireland or Austria. In 2013, Poland ranked 4th for its 
agrifood trade surplus (EUR 6.2 billion) behind the Netherlands (22.5), France (11.7) and Spain (8.9), here too 
outpacing such big traders as Denmark (5.4), Belgium (4.3) or Ireland (3.0). In this list Hungary ranks 8th with a 
surplus of EUR 2.78 billion, way ahead of Lithuania (0.95) and Bulgaria (0.83).
Despite the differences in revealed trade performance, there is a consensus among experts that the EU10 
countries, in general, have profited from their accession to the European Union, as they have been able to 
increase their trade flows and took advantage of the expansion of the free trade area.70 And so did the old 
member states. By taking advantage of the strength of their economies and making full use of the mutual market 
liberalisation, the EU15 suppliers were able – despite the tariff barrier decrease asymmetry favouring the EU10 or 
even without any preferences – to increase their deliveries to the new member states considerably already prior 
to enlargement.71
The fact that Poland stands out so much by its trade performance of the group of the EU10, while Romania in 
spite of its second place within the EU10 for both agricultural output and GVA (see Table 2) is lagging behind –
not only behind Poland but also behind Hungary, the Czech republic and Lithuania – draws the attention to an 
important issue. In the mentioned Commission paper, there is a key statement on NMS trade profile being similar 
to that of the EU15. According to the Commission, as a result of the ten-year membership, two-thirds of the NMS 
trade consists of final goods with higher value indicating that the food industry had already caught up with its 
EU15 counterparts.
Among the winners of this process Germany should be mentioned first, but Austria as well –
due to their very competitive food industry – and some other countries (like e.g. Italy and Spain, see Table 6).
72 This statement may be true for the NMS (2004), but the situation becomes different for the 
EU10, with Romania and Bulgaria. In their case, the share of final goods in total agrifood trade was about 60 per 
cent for imports and only 30 per cent for exports in 2013.73
70 See: Carraresi – Banterle (2013) p. 7 or Csáki – Jámbor (2013) p. 45.
71 Juhász (2009) p. 7 and p. 114
72 European Commission (2014) p. 9
73 In 2013, 86.5% of EU10 agrifood imports had their origin in EU, and as most of them came from the EU15 or from Western 
multinationals implanted in EU10, the share of final goods was relatively high, and for this aspect without much difference all over the 
EU10. As for the exports, they are much less homogenous as for their destination, and their structure also vary a lot from country to
country. (Source: Eurostat)
This explains why Romania’s trade performance is so 
much poorer than its output and why it is lagging far more behind Poland in exports than in production. It is the 
structure of the exports that matters, and in this regards, the two Balkan countries have a lot to do if they want to 
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catch up with their EU10 rivals (see Figure 5). Of course, the structure of exports is highly dependent on the 
structure of production, and thus we are back to where we started: pointing at the disastrous shift in agricultural 
production from a balanced structure towards a more extensive one, with more crop growing and less animal 
breeding (see Figure 1). In this field, although Romania is in the worst and Bulgaria in the second worst position, 
it is to remember that Hungary, Lithuania as well as the Czech Republic have recently seen their livestock 
decrease to a dangerously low level, too.
Figure 5: Structure of the agrifood exports by category of product
 
Source: Eurostat
Reasons behind changes – with some focus on Hungary
In this chapter, when assessing the whys of the above described production and trade patterns, a clear distinction 
will be made between the circumstances that affected all EU10 countries and those that resulted from the specific 
development of Hungary. Let us start with the former ones. As already mentioned, the application of a ten-year 
transitional period in the new member states – with gradual phasing-in of CAP direct payments, but provisions for 
an immediate and reciprocal market opening at the moment of enlargement – put an enormous competitive 
pressure on farmers and the whole agrifood business across the EU10.
A second challenge for the new entrants was the adoption of an extraordinary CAP reform in 2003, just before the 
Eastern enlargement took place, and in the elaboration of which the new members had no say. In practice, in the 
EU there are two different support systems in force: one for the old member states (plus Slovenia and Malta, the 
only NMS able to implement the new support scheme) with more room to differentiate the support by farm or by 
region; and another one for the new member states where such a possibility is nonexistent.
Finally, a third factor in connection with the difficult (if not unequal) competitive environments for EU10 farmers: in 
any case, when normative CAP rules would be “too” beneficial for some of the new member states (or too costly 
for the common budget) the old members (most of them being net contributors to the budget) act immediately and 
change the rule. Already, when preparing the 2003 CAP reform, the Commission feared that coupled direct 
payments would attract the conversion of more arable land into rye area and/or encourage a shift from potatoes 
to rye in the new member states (especially in Poland), thus proposed the abolition of rye intervention.74
74 European Commission (2002) p. 7 and (2003) p. 60
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soon after the enlargement when, thanks to successive good harvests, the European intervention stock of maize 
increased to 40 per cent of that of cereals (and of which 93 per cent were stored in Hungary), the Commission did 
not hesitate to propose an end to public intervention for maize75. Hungarian farmers were pointed at and blamed 
for having an interest in selling into intervention rather than trying to export76. No time was given them to adapt to 
their new environment.
Table 7: Changes in agricultural output and GVA
Euro per hectare
Output Gross value added
2005 2007 2010 2005 2007 2010
Czech Republic 907 1 205 1 114 281 343 277
Estonia 655 771 710 263 337 250
Latvia 325 419 370 116 139 92
Lithuania 582 784 745 216 290 237
Poland 907 1 264 1 263 413 539 537
Slovenia 2 199 2 306 2 298 989 879 848
Slovakia 869 944 995 239 272 191
EU15 2 242 2 432 2 399 1 035 1 080 996
NMS (2004) 947 1 201 1 154 383 464 422
EU7 847 1 132 1 105 348 442 409
Hungary 1 413 1 504 1 284 519 538 422
EU8 927 1 183 1 133 372 455 411
Romania 826 984 1 142 445 454 495
Bulgaria 1 231 1 087 854 566 402 303
EU10 915 1 119 1 109 405 451 424
Source: Eurostat
Apart from the aforementioned unequal competitive market positions generated by the differing subsidisation 
level in the EU15 and the EU10 and explaining mostly differences in performance between these two country 
groups, there are other factors that explain differences among the EU10 themselves. Naturally, a lot depended on 
the initial conditions (like natural and capital endowments) that prevailed at the time of accession. In this respect, 
one has to remember that Slovenia by far had (and still has) the most developed agricultural sector among EU10 
countries which is reflected in data on per hectare value of output and gross value added (see Table 7). Although 
since 2009, the agribusiness of the country has been severely suffering from the unfavourable macroeconomic 
situation (see Figure 6), the Slovene agricultural performance is virtually standing alone within the EU10 being the 
only one to be compared with that of the EU15.
An important element of initial conditions is related to the difference in farm structure. In most of the EU10 
countries, there was a dual farm structure at the time of accession; with a large number of small plots, too small 
to be viable and competitive on the Single market, and a relatively small number of very large entities, a sort of 
heritage of the collective farming system with some embedded inefficiencies. Only Poland and Slovenia were 
characterised by a European type farming system with small and lower middle family businesses, which proved to 
75 European Commission (2006)
76 European Parliament (2007)
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be beneficial. It is not only that countries with farm structures similar to those in the EU founding countries can 
more easily take advantage of the CAP regime than the others; but there are opinions stating that in Europe the
best framework for animal breeding is provided for by family farms of appropriate size.  In the latter, it is still 
possible to deal with the animals individually, while risks (like diseases) and tasks (e.g. manure treatment) arising 
from keeping too many animals in too small places are not significant yet.77
Also, the EU10 agriculture had been strongly influenced by the policy framework prevailing in the pre-accession 
period. Farmers in countries with initially high and uneven price and market support (e.g. Hungary and Romania) 
are considered to have lost with accession as it hardly brought any price increase for them. On the other hand, 
farmers in countries (like in Poland) where prices remained low before accession have gained. As for land 
policies, according to whether being restrictive (e.g. in Hungary) or liberal (like in the Baltics), they hampered or 
helped the agricultural sector to attract capital from inside or outside the sector.78
Regarding the specialties of the Hungarian agriculture, one general remark has to be made. A basic feature of the 
transition process that made the difference with its main rivals was that in no other candidate country had there 
been so much struggle against a functioning sector of the economy in order to redistribute its capital goods, 
subsidies, political power and other positions of influence than in Hungary.79 Privatization, restitution (of lands to 
former owners) and land laws (restricting land ownership to domestic physical persons) destroyed the confidence 
in the countryside, increased instability in land ownership, led to irresponsible land use and inhibited long-term 
investments.80
The competitiveness of the Hungarian livestock production has never been very high. Its natural endowments 
(lack of enough rainfall, hence lack of enough pastures and meadows) put the country at a competitive 
disadvantage against its neighbours or the Western European countries. In pre-transition times, the low 
profitability (or even the deficit) of the animal husbandry was hidden (and cross-financed) from the excellent profit 
of the auxiliary activities of the cooperatives.81
The decline of animal husbandry has serious consequences for the entire agricultural sector. As the total number 
of livestock units in Hungary dropped to less than half of what it was in the mid-1980s
Then, the shock of the transition and the EU accession ran, in two 
waves, down the sector to its competitive core. Since the EU accession alone, nearly four thousand commercial 
livestock farms have shut down in Hungary. In addition, there still exists the problem of low profitability, especially 
for pig and poultry breeding, the latter showing much better ability to react to market changes than the former.
82, the lack of enough 
natural manure makes it more and more difficult to improve the quality of the soils, and thereby indirectly renders 
the fight against drought less efficient.83
77 Pouliquen (1995)
78 Csáki – Jámbor (2013) p. 47
79 Varga (2004) p. 24
80 Juhász (2012)
81 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Hungarian statistical office (KSH) had not even reported data on the net profitability of the livestock sector. 
(Szabó – 2014)
82 KSH – https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/agrar/html/tabl1_5_2_1.html
83 So, the increased volatility in crop yields, reflected in increased volatility in crop production (see Figure 2), comes not only from weather 
condition (or climate change), but also from the lack of such common element as manure.  
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Figure 6: Cumulative real GDP growths since 2001
Source: Eurostat
Of course, the performance of the Hungarian agriculture cannot be separated from the broader context of the 
Hungarian economy. As after 2006 Hungary detached itself from the regional mainstream and has since then 
followed a much slower path of development than most of its partners in Central Europe (see Figure 6)84, the 
domestic market for agrifood products has also narrowed. In 2011, per capita food consumption was 90 per cent 
of what it was in the 1980s (see Table 8). The most dramatic decline took place in consumption of animal 
products, staple food (except for potatoes) and sugar, while major improvement occurred only for foodstuffs (e.g. 
fish or fruits and vegetables) for which much of the increase was supposed to come from imports (e.g. tropical 
products).
Table 8: Annual per capita food consumption in Hungary
kg
Meat Fish Milk Eggs Fats
Flour, 
rice
Pota-
toes
Sugar, 
honey
Fruits,
vege-
tables
Other 
plant 
prod.
Total
1980s (A) 76.2 2.4 183.6 18.7 35.0 111.5 56.1 37.2 154.5 4.0 679.0
2011 (B) 55.8 3.6 152.3 12.6 34.4 84.9 63.5 28.4 177.9 4.1 617.5
A/B 137% 66% 121% 148% 102% 131% 88% 131% 87% 98% 110%
B/A 73% 151% 83% 68% 98% 76% 113% 76% 115% 103% 91%
1980s = decade average
Source: KSH85
Another factor, which in the course of time, proved to be a further limitation of possibilities for Hungarian 
agriculture, was the hasted privatisation of the food industry in the 1990s. It took place in two rounds – first the 
‘luxury articles’ (sugar, tobacco, beverages and confectionary), then the ‘heavy artillery’ (cereal, milk, meat) – at a 
84 Something similar happened to Slovenia a couple years later.
85 http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_hosszu/elm14.html
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Slovenia
Miklós Somai: The new member states and the common agricultural policy: Expectations, preparation...
Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 77
time when the country was still at the forefront of the transition process in the region. As the old co-operatives 
were weakened, the farmers were not able to participate in the privatisation adequately, and more than half of the 
food industry, even entire segments of it, was sold to foreign investors. Later on, as institutions of market 
economy have been gradually developed in the neighbouring countries, the new foreign owners of the Hungarian 
food industry started to ‘rationalise’ (i.e. relocate) their production geographically in the neighbouring region.86
Finally, one has to mention the problem of the hidden (or black) economy. Its share in the agriculture and the food 
industry is estimated to be between 20 and 30 per cent. Relatively high tax burden, weak legal security and mass 
unemployment provide ideal environment for the hidden economy in Hungary. The complex and discriminatory 
tax system creates motivation primarily for the small businesses to engage in tax evasion. But in this way, 
indirectly, larger businesses are also involved. High level of tax evasion in agrifood economy is most harmful as it 
impedes integration, retards concentration, reduces transparency and discourages farmers to form producer 
organisations.87
The CAP reform and the overall MFF deal were closely linked together throughout the negotiations. 
Consequently, when evaluating whether the EU10 countries are losers or winners of the new CAP, it is important 
to place the problem in the broader context of the MFF package. In this respect, it is interesting to discover that in 
terms of commitments, the new MFF makes real cuts only for those headings (agricultural and cohesion policies) 
where the EU10 have traditionally been more successful in obtaining community assistance. On the other hand,
funds grow most under those headings (e.g. competitiveness) and sub-headings (e.g. research) where the EU10 
starting position to draw on funds has traditionally been less favourable compared to that of the EU15.
A new CAP regime for 2014-2020
January 2014 marked the launch of the new seven-year Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2014-2020) of 
the EU. One of the most important changes compared to the previous (2007-2013) MFF is the re-designed 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the reform of which was formally adopted first by the European Parliament 
(EP) in November and then by the Council of Agriculture Ministers in December 2013. The new CAP relates to 
five important EP/Council regulations: direct payments, the single common market organisation, rural 
development and a horizontal regulation for financing, managing and monitoring the CAP. The fifth regulation 
defines the transitional rules for the year 2014 as, for technical reasons, the direct payments regulation will only 
apply as of 1 January 2015.
88
86 This move gained momentum as the Hungarian economy slowed down after 2006. Between 2003 and 2010, the output of the food 
industry lost one fifth in volume. Even if a slight recovery has been taking place since then, no clear reversal of the trend can be observed 
yet. (Potori – 2014)
87 There are sectors where the reason why there is no inter-branch organisation is that traders are not interested in transparency. (Potori –
Ibid)
88 European Commission (web-2) 
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Figure 7: Redistribution of direct payments
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development (2013) p. 30
As direct payments (DPs) make up about 70 percent of CAP budget, at times of bargaining they are always at the 
centre of attention. Differences in per hectare support – which became more pronounced after the enlargements 
in 2004 and 2007 – were a subject of constant complaint by the new entrants, especially the three Baltic States 
and Romania and Bulgaria. Now the new CAP, while cutting back DPs in general, allocates relatively more 
support for those member states (MS) where per hectare payment is below 90 percent of the EU average. It also 
guarantees a minimum level of EUR 196 per hectare aid to be reached by 2019 (see Figure 7). These changes 
are to be financed by members with above EU average DPs per hectare. Thus, in the new CAP there is a modest 
redistribution of the DPs across (and also within) the MS, a phenomenon called external (and internal) 
convergence.
When assessing the impacts of external convergence on the EU10 countries, we have to take into account the 
following: first, DPs will be put on a strict diet in the next MFF; second, the EU-27 will have to finance DPs for 
Croatia; and third, external convergence will have to be financed by members with above EU average DPs (i.e. 
also by Slovenia). If we compare average DPs of the period of 2015-2020 to those of 2013 (see bars in the 
middle in Figure 8) or the DPs of the end year of the old and the new MFF (see right-side bars in Figure 8), it is 
clear that in real terms for most of the EU10 DPs will decrease rather than increase. Only the Baltic States 
(especially Latvia and Estonia) can get access to substantially more support than in the previous period.
Another aspect of the DP regime is related to the already mentioned fact that with the exception of Slovenia and 
Malta all other NMS apply the simplified Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS), a flat rate payment per hectare at 
member state level. Originally, the SAPS was established for five years. However, following the reform of 2008
(the so-called “Health Check”) its application was extended until 2013, and now the new CAP deal changed the 
end-date to 2020. In the meantime, in the old member states, the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) has been in use 
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since the 2003 reform. The calculation of the SPS varies from one country to another, and, depending on the 
model chosen, reflects past performances at individual and/or regional level. As such a differentiation is 
impossible with the SAPS, the differences in per hectare support between the old and the new members, which 
are to be decreased by the external convergence (see above), will remain considerable at farm gate level. The 
so-called internal convergence may, however, be considered as a first step in the right direction as it pushes the 
countries with historical references to move towards a fairer and more converging per hectare payment at 
national or regional level.89
Source: European Commission (web-2)
A third important feature of the new common agricultural policy relates to the fact that it will be anything but 
common. Although there will be a common framework, because the new regulation makes the whole system 
largely flexible and renders several main elements optional, in practice 28 different agricultural policies will be 
implemented. The share of “coupled” payments for example, which are linked to a specific product, may reach as 
much as 15% of the national envelop and the Commission may approve an even higher rate where justified. In 
case of general market disturbances the Commission will for all sectors be authorised to take emergency 
measures. Further flexibilities and options involve the possibility to redistribute payments for the first hectares of 
the farms, and/or towards small farmers, and/or towards farms situated in less favoured areas and in areas with 
natural constraints. There is also a possibility to transfer quite important shares (i.e. up to 15-25%) of funds 
between the two pillars of the CAP.
Figure 8: Evolution of direct payments in real terms (2011 prices) under the new MFF deal (2014-
2020) compared with the old one (MFF 2007-2013)
As for some special issues where the EU10 could have easily been on the loser side (e.g. capping and greening), 
we must note that the Commission’s original proposals were considerably watered down in the final version of the 
reform. Instead of introducing a compulsory capping – which would have been progressive for farms with DPs 
more than EUR 150 thousand a year and confiscating above EUR 300 thousand – there will only be a 
89 The member states have two options: either to achieve a regional/national rate by 2019 or to get individual rates closer to each other by 
the same date. In the latter case by gradually increasing those under 90% of the average (with the setting up of a minimum level at 60%) to 
the detriment of those above the average but with possible limitation of individual losses to 30%. (Source: European Commission – 2013a, 
p. 2)
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compulsory “degressivity” and a voluntary “capping”. This, in practice, will take away at least 5% of the DP above 
EUR 150 thousand (greening not included and with the possibility for the salary costs to be deducted before 
calculation), which is good news for the biggest farms vis-à-vis the originally envisaged “confiscatory” capping.90
As for the greening, two of its three basic practices (crop diversification and ecological focus area) will only be 
applied above a certain farm size, which is good news for the very small farms. Due to dual farm structures in 
some EU10 countries – an enduring heritage of the past – very big and very small farms are of quite importance. 
So, all changes affecting their incomes or costs pose important challenges at the political level.91
90 This reduction does not need to apply to members states applying the redistributive payment under which at least 5% of their national 
envelope is held back for redistribution on the first hectares of all farms. (Source: European Commission – 2013b, p. 2)
91 Interestingly, the Hungarian government decided to introduce the capping in the spirit of the Commission’s original proposals, i.e. by 
imposing a sort of “confiscatory” capping on farms cultivating more than 1200 hectares.(Source: Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture –
http://www.kormany.hu/hu/foldmuvelesugyi-miniszterium/parlamenti-allamtitkarsag/hirek/a-kormany-minimalizalni-akarja-az-orosz-
embargo-karat
Conclusions
No sector of the economy can cut itself from its broader social and economic surroundings and developments. 
When trying to assess the causes behind the differences in agriculture development speed in the EU10 countries, 
one can enumerate several factors: natural and capital endowments, initial positions and structures, pre- and 
post-accession strategies and policies. But what really counts is the general social and economic framework that 
can help or hamper the development and modernisation of agriculture. When, on the bases of facts and statistics 
presented in this study, Poland and Estonia are considered to be the two most successful countries of the region, 
this statement seems to harmonise with the above theory.
As for Hungary, a combination of inexperience and greed of the new elite resulted in a stagnating economy with 
low or limited growth prospects. The number of the farms halved since 2000. The sector is becoming more and 
more specialised and focusing on field crops (mainly wheat, maize, sunflower and colza), while switching away 
from livestock breeding or other similarly labour-intensive activities like the production of certain vegetables, 
which are gradually shrinking and/or stagnating at a very low level. One can only hope that generous CAP
support will at least be sufficient to prevent the agricultural sector from being further distanced from its main 
rivals.
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